Critically examine the implications of the disintegration of the Soviet Union on India's security and strategic perspectives. What further responses would you suggest in India's foreign policy to accommodate these implications?
Weigh the real losses and the hidden gains for India's security after 1991, reach a balanced verdict, and then propose concrete foreign-policy responses.
Common trap: Weak answers only lament the loss of a friend. A strong answer separates the immediate shocks (defence supply, veto, rupee trade) from the long-term opening (US, Israel, ASEAN), notes the Central Asian security vacuum, and ends with specific responses of a 2010 vintage.
SyllabusOld-pattern GS Paper II (2006–12): India and the World — India's foreign policy, relations with major powers and neighbours, changing world order
Model answer
20 marks · 250-word limitThe break-up of the USSR in December 1991 removed the superpower that had underwritten India's security since the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. It coincided with India's balance-of-payments crisis, so New Delhi lost a diplomatic shield, its main arms supplier and a soft trading partner at the same moment.
- Veto cover on Kashmir at the UNSC
- Bulk of defence supplies disrupted
- Rupee-rouble trade ended
- Unipolar US pressure (NPT, MTCR)
- Security vacuum in Central Asia
- Freedom to engage the US
- Ties with Israel (1992)
- Look East Policy to ASEAN
- Diversified arms sources
- Multi-alignment and strategic autonomy
Security and strategic implications
- Diplomatic shield: Moscow's vetoes had blocked hostile resolutions on Kashmir and Bangladesh; after 1991 India faced Western pressure on Kashmir human rights and the NPT/CTBT alone.
- Defence dependence: The bulk of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force inventory was Soviet-made; spares and servicing were scattered across newly independent states, hurting readiness through the 1990s.
- Technology denial: In 1993 Russia, under US pressure citing the MTCR, withdrew from transferring cryogenic rocket engine technology to ISRO, showing how far Moscow's room had shrunk.
- Central Asian vacuum: Five weak Central Asian states, civil war in Tajikistan and the Taliban's rise in Afghanistan (1996) opened space for radical Islamism and for Pakistan and China to expand influence.
- Economic shock: The end of rupee-rouble trade hit exports of tea, textiles and drugs at the time of the 1991 crisis.
The other side: a liberating shock
- Freedom to diversify: Without bloc constraints India normalised ties with Israel in 1992, launched the Look East Policy and began defence purchases from France, Israel and later the US.
- US partnership: The thaw culminated in the 2005 framework, the 123 Agreement and the NSG waiver of September 2008, ending India's nuclear isolation.
- Russia retained: The 1993 Treaty of Friendship, the Strategic Partnership of 2000, the BrahMos joint venture (1998), licensed Su-30MKI production and the Admiral Gorshkov deal kept Moscow India's key defence partner.
Suggested responses in foreign policy
- Multi-alignment: Keep strategic autonomy: deepen the US partnership without becoming a junior ally, and use RIC, BRIC (first summit 2009) and the SCO, where India is an observer, as balancing forums.
- Reinvent ties with Russia: Move from buyer-seller to co-development (fifth-generation fighter, multi-role transport aircraft) and widen trade beyond defence, including energy (Sakhalin-1) and the North-South Transport Corridor.
- Central Asia: Secure energy and transit through TAPI, Iran's Chabahar port and a modest presence such as the Ayni air base in Tajikistan; counter extremism through intelligence cooperation.
- Self-reliance: Indigenise defence production through DRDO and private industry so that no single supplier's fate decides India's preparedness.
The Soviet collapse was a short-term blow but a long-term release: it forced India to rebuild its security on diversified partnerships and economic strength. The right response is not a new patron but strategic autonomy backed by indigenous capability. (Later: the Connect Central Asia policy of 2012 and India's full SCO membership in 2017 followed this logic.)
Read more — sources
- BookC. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy
- BookV.P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy in a Changing World
- OfficialMinistry of External Affairs, Annual Reports; India-Russia Declaration on Strategic Partnership (October 2000)
More from GS Paper II (old) 2010
Model answer by the EdiShorts editorial team. It is one well-argued treatment of the question, written to the official word limit — not an official UPSC answer key.