The 'Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and its Members' as envisaged in Article 105 of the Constitution leave room for a large number of un-codified and un-enumerated privileges to continue. Assess the reasons for the absence of legal codification of the 'parliamentary privileges'. How can this problem be addressed ?
Weigh the reasons Parliament has avoided codifying its privileges under Article 105(3), judge how valid they are, and then suggest concrete ways to define and limit privileges without weakening Parliament's independence.
Common trap: Weak answers merely list privileges. The question has two parts: reasons for non-codification (fear of judicial review under Article 13, flexibility, sovereignty claims) and the remedy. A top answer cites Keshav Singh, M.S.M. Sharma and Raja Ram Pal, notes the post-44th Amendment wording, and proposes calibrated codification as in Australia.
SyllabusParliament and State legislatures—structure, functioning, conduct of business, powers & privileges and issues arising out of these.
Model answer
12.5 marks · 200-word limitArticle 105 (and Article 194 for state legislatures) gives freedom of speech in Parliament and immunity from court proceedings for anything said or any vote given. For all other privileges, Article 105(3) says they shall be those defined by Parliament by law and, until then, those existing before the 44th Amendment (1978), which in effect are the privileges of the British House of Commons as at 1950.
- Article 105(3): privileges left undefined
- Courts test privilege vs rights
- Fear: codified law reviewable under Article 13
- Uncertainty for press and citizens
- Minimal codification with safeguards
Why privileges remain uncodified
- Fear of judicial review: A privilege law would be "law" under Article 13 and could be tested against Fundamental Rights, whereas uncodified privileges were held in M.S.M. Sharma (1959) to prevail over Article 19(1)(a).
- Need for flexibility: Parliament argues that contempt of the House takes new forms and a closed list would leave it unable to protect its dignity and functioning.
- Institutional pride: Presiding officers see the power to define contempt and punish as inherent to a sovereign legislature, and there is little political consensus to give it up.
- Convention-based model: Like Westminster, Indian legislatures rely on precedent, the Committee of Privileges and Speaker's rulings rather than statute.
Problems created by non-codification
- Clash with courts: The Keshav Singh reference (1964) saw the Uttar Pradesh Assembly and the Allahabad High Court in open confrontation over a privilege committal.
- Chilling effect on the press: Journalists and citizens cannot know in advance what amounts to breach of privilege, and legislatures act as accuser and judge.
- Immunity for corruption: In P.V. Narasimha Rao (1998), bribe-takers who voted were held immune under Article 105(2), a reading many found indefensible (overruled in Sita Soren, 2024).
- Partial clarity: Raja Ram Pal (2007) upheld the expulsion of MPs in the cash-for-query case but held that the exercise of privileges is open to judicial review for illegality or violation of rights.
How the problem can be addressed
- Calibrated codification: Enact a law defining core privileges needed for functioning, as the NCRWC recommended in 2002, leaving speech and voting immunity untouched.
- Learn from abroad: Australia's Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1987 defines contempt narrowly and caps penalties, while the UK Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (1999) also favoured legislation.
- Procedural fairness: Give the person charged notice, a hearing and reasons, and limit punishment to what protects the House rather than its members' reputations.
- Narrow the immunity: Make clear that bribery to influence a vote is not protected, since it is outside the legislative function.
Privileges exist to protect the independence of Parliament, not to place legislators above the law. A short, rights-compatible code with fair procedure would preserve that independence while ending the uncertainty that now pits legislatures against courts, the press and citizens.
Read more — sources
- NCERTIndian Constitution at Work (Class XI) — Ch. 5, Legislature
- OfficialNational Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), Report, 2002
- BookM.N. Kaul and S.L. Shakdher, Practice and Procedure of Parliament
- OfficialSupreme Court of India, Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184
More from GS Paper 2 2014
Model answer by the EdiShorts editorial team. It is one well-argued treatment of the question, written to the official word limit — not an official UPSC answer key.