Resorting to ordinances has always raised concern on violation of the spirit of separation of powers doctrine. While noting the rationales justifying the power to promulgate ordinances, analyze whether the decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue have further facilitated resorting to this power. Should the power to promulgate ordinances be repealed?
Break the issue into its parts: the rationale for the power, what the Supreme Court has held and with what effect, and then answer the final question with a reasoned yes or no.
Common trap: The question has three parts and most answers skip the second. A top answer shows that the Court's early deference (A.K. Roy, T. Venkata Reddy) eased resort to ordinances while D.C. Wadhwa restrained re-promulgation, and gives a clear verdict on repeal.
SyllabusSeparation of powers between various organs dispute redressal mechanisms and institutions.
Model answer
12.5 marks · 200-word limitArticle 123 lets the President, and Article 213 the Governor, promulgate an ordinance when the legislature is not in session and circumstances demand immediate action. It lapses six weeks after the legislature reassembles. The land acquisition ordinance, issued in December 2014 and re-promulgated twice in 2015, revived the debate on executive law-making.
- 1970R.C. Cooper: satisfaction open to scrutiny
- 197538th Amendment makes satisfaction final
- 197844th Amendment removes that bar
- 1982A.K. Roy: review possible, but deference
- 1985T. Venkata Reddy: ordinance equals statute
- 1987D.C. Wadhwa: re-promulgation a fraud
Rationale for the power
- Urgency: Parliament sits for only part of the year; sudden needs, such as a security threat or a court ruling that creates a legal vacuum, cannot wait.
- Inherited and defended: The power descends from Section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935; B.R. Ambedkar defended it in the Constituent Assembly as necessary when the legislature is not in session.
- Built-in checks: It acts on Cabinet advice, must be laid before Parliament and is bound by Part III.
Has the Supreme Court facilitated it?
- Early tussle: R.C. Cooper (1970) opened the President's satisfaction to scrutiny; the 38th Amendment (1975) made it final, and the 44th Amendment (1978) removed that immunity.
- Deference: A.K. Roy (1982) held that the President's satisfaction is not immune from review but declined to probe it, and T. Venkata Reddy (1985) held that an ordinance cannot be struck down for improper motive, just as a statute cannot.
- Restraint: In D.C. Wadhwa v State of Bihar (1987) the Court held re-promulgation without placing ordinances before the legislature to be a fraud on the Constitution, after Bihar re-promulgated 256 ordinances between 1967 and 1981.
- Net effect: By treating ordinances as legislation and avoiding scrutiny of urgency, the case law left space for frequent use, curbed only in its extreme form of serial re-promulgation.
Should the power be repealed?
- No, but reform it: Repeal would leave a gap in emergencies; better to limit ordinances to genuine urgency, bar repeated re-promulgation, require a statement of reasons and convene Parliament promptly.
The ordinance is a safety valve, not a parallel legislature. Its legitimacy depends on restraint by the executive, vigilance by Parliament and searching review by the courts. Since then, Krishna Kumar Singh (2017) has held that satisfaction is justiciable and that re-promulgation is a fraud on the Constitution.
Read more — sources
- OfficialConstitution of India — Articles 123 and 213
- OfficialD.C. Wadhwa v State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 378, Supreme Court of India
- NCERTIndian Constitution at Work (Class XI) — Ch. 4, Executive
- BookM. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity — chapter on the President (ordinance-making power)
Related questions from earlier years
More from GS Paper 2 2015
Model answer by the EdiShorts editorial team. It is one well-argued treatment of the question, written to the official word limit — not an official UPSC answer key.