Use of internet and social media by non-state actors for subversive activities is a major security concern. How have these been misused in the recent past? Suggest effective guidelines to curb the above threat.
Two parts: show how the internet and social media were actually misused with recent examples, then propose practical, rights-compliant guidelines to curb the threat.
Common trap: Answers often skip the 'recent past' part or propose blanket bans. A top answer gives specific Indian incidents (2012 exodus, 2013 Muzaffarnagar, 2014 ISIS handle, 2016 Kashmir) and guidelines that respect Shreya Singhal and Article 19.
SyllabusRole of external state and non-state actors in creating challenges to internal security. Challenges to internal security through communication networks, role of media and social networking sites in internal security challenges, basics of cyber security; money-laundering and its prevention.
Model answer
15 marks · 250-word limitNon-state actors use the internet for propaganda, recruitment, radicalisation, fund-raising, rumour-mongering and attack coordination, because it is cheap, anonymous and borderless. In India this has fuelled communal violence and terror recruitment, testing the IT Act, 2000 and the National Cyber Security Policy, 2013.
- Propaganda and fake or morphed content
- Viral spread through social media and messaging
- Radicalisation, panic or communal anger
- Recruitment, funding, mobilisation
- Violence, exodus or terror attack
Misuse in the recent past
- Exodus of 2012: Threatening SMS and MMS messages after the Assam violence triggered the flight of about 30,000 north-eastern people from Bengaluru in August 2012.
- Muzaffarnagar, 2013: A fake video shared on social media inflamed passions before the riots in western Uttar Pradesh.
- ISIS online: The influential pro-Islamic State Twitter handle ShamiWitness was found to be run by a man in India, who was arrested, and online radicalisation drew a few Indian youths to the group.
- Kashmir, 2016: Burhan Wani's social media videos glamorised militancy, and the unrest after his killing on 8 July 2016 led to long curfews and internet suspensions in the Valley.
- Coordination: The 26/11 Mumbai attackers' handlers in Pakistan used VoIP calls to guide them in real time.
Guidelines to curb the threat
- Clear legal basis: Use Section 69A of the IT Act to block content and enforce intermediary due diligence under Section 79, within the limits set by Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015), which struck down Section 66A.
- Platform accountability: Require quick takedown of terror and incitement content, preserve logs, and appoint India-based grievance and law-enforcement contacts.
- Monitoring and response: Strengthen CERT-In, state cyber cells and social-media labs with trained staff, and issue fast official rebuttals of rumours.
- Counter-narrative and literacy: Engage clerics, families and influencers, run deradicalisation programmes and teach digital literacy in schools.
- Calibrated shutdowns: Use internet suspension only as a last, time-bound and reviewed measure.
The answer lies not in censoring the internet but in making it hostile to subversion: precise laws, accountable platforms, capable cyber policing and credible counter-voices. Since then, the IT Rules, 2021 have tightened intermediary obligations, though their balance with free speech remains debated.
Read more — sources
- OfficialInformation Technology Act, 2000 — Sections 69A and 79, and Intermediary Guidelines Rules, 2011
- OfficialNational Cyber Security Policy, 2013 (Department of Electronics and Information Technology)
- OfficialShreya Singhal v Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 — Supreme Court of India
Related questions from earlier years
More from GS Paper 3 2016
Model answer by the EdiShorts editorial team. It is one well-argued treatment of the question, written to the official word limit — not an official UPSC answer key.