Judicial Legislation is antithetical to the doctrine of separation of powers as envisaged in the Indian Constitution. In this context justify the filing of large number of public interest petitions praying for issuing guidelines to executive authorities.
Give reasons that make a position defensible; here, accept the separation-of-powers objection and then show why guideline-seeking PILs are still warranted, and within what limits.
Common trap: Candidates either praise PIL or condemn judicial overreach. The demand is to justify the petitions: name the legislative and executive vacuums that drive them, cite guideline cases, and show that guidelines are interim, filling gaps until the legislature acts.
SyllabusSeparation of powers between various organs dispute redressal mechanisms and institutions.
Model answer
15 marks · 250-word limitIndia follows a functional rather than rigid separation of powers, as the Supreme Court held in Ram Jawaya Kapur (1955). Yet through Articles 32, 141 and 142 the Court has framed binding guidelines in many PILs, which critics call judicial legislation. The flood of such petitions is largely a response to governance gaps.
- 1984Lakshmi Kant Pandey: inter-country adoption norms
- 1997Vishaka: workplace sexual harassment guidelines
- 1997D.K. Basu: safeguards on arrest and custody
- 1998Vineet Narain: CBI insulation and CVC oversight
- 2006Prakash Singh: seven directives on police reform
- 2018Tehseen Poonawalla: anti-lynching measures
Why judicial legislation is criticised
- Democratic deficit: Judges are not elected or accountable to voters, and the constitutional scheme, including Article 50's separation of the judiciary from the executive, assumes each organ stays within its sphere.
- Judicial self-caution: In Aravali Golf Club v Chander Hass (2008), the Supreme Court itself warned against judges running the government.
- Implementation gap: Many guidelines remain on paper; Prakash Singh directives are still only partly complied with by States years later.
Why the petitions are justified
- Legislative vacuum: Vishaka filled a void using CEDAW and Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 until Parliament enacted the POSH Act, 2013, which shows guidelines as a bridge, not a substitute.
- Executive inaction on rights: D.K. Basu responded to custodial deaths, and Hussainara Khatoon (1979) to undertrials held longer than their possible sentences.
- Access to justice: After S.P. Gupta (1981) relaxed locus standi, letters and petitions on behalf of prisoners, bonded labourers and the poor became the only route for voiceless groups.
- Institutional integrity: Vineet Narain and the Common Cause living-will verdict (2018) addressed areas where executive capture or legislative silence left rights unprotected.
Limits that keep it legitimate
- Interim and rights-based: Guidelines should operate only until law is made and only where a fundamental right is at stake.
- Self-restraint: Courts should refuse policy PILs on economic choices and filter frivolous or publicity petitions, as the Court has warned in several orders.
Guideline PILs are justified as constitutional gap-filling when Articles 14 and 21 are under threat and the other organs are silent. The durable answer is a more responsive legislature and executive, so that the Court returns to its core role of review rather than rule-making.
Read more — sources
- NCERTIndian Constitution at Work (Class XI) — Ch. 6, Judiciary
- OfficialSupreme Court of India — Vishaka v State of Rajasthan (1997); D.K. Basu v State of West Bengal (1997); Prakash Singh v Union of India (2006)
- BookM. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity
Related questions from earlier years
More from GS Paper 2 2020
Model answer by the EdiShorts editorial team. It is one well-argued treatment of the question, written to the official word limit — not an official UPSC answer key.