Constitutional mechanisms to resolve the inter-state water disputes have failed to address and solve the problems. Is the failure due to structural or process inadequacy or both? Discuss.
Show where the constitutional and statutory machinery for water disputes has failed, then classify the causes as structural, procedural or both, with examples.
Common trap: The question asks you to diagnose, so do not just narrate the Cauvery dispute. A top answer sets out Article 262 and the 1956 Acts, separates design flaws from process failures with named tribunals, and concludes that both are at fault.
SyllabusFunctions and responsibilities of the Union and the States, issues and challenges pertaining to the federal structure, devolution of powers and finances up to local levels and challenges therein.
Model answer
10 marks · 200-word limitArticle 262 lets Parliament provide for adjudication of inter-state river disputes and bar the jurisdiction of courts. Parliament enacted the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act and the River Boards Act in 1956, yet disputes over the Cauvery, Ravi-Beas, Krishna and Mahadayi have run for decades, pointing to failures of both design and process.
- Ad hoc tribunal for each dispute
- No machinery to enforce awards
- River Boards Act never used
- Water a State subject (Entry 17)
- Delay in setting up tribunals
- Awards take decades
- States defy or reopen awards
- Poor shared data on flows
Structural inadequacies
- Ad hoc tribunals: Each dispute gets a fresh tribunal with no permanent body or precedent, so expertise is lost and the process restarts every time.
- No enforcement: The 2002 amendment gave a notified award the force of a Supreme Court decree, but there is no authority to release water in distress years, as Karnataka's resistance on the Cauvery shows.
- Unused river boards: Not a single board has been set up under the River Boards Act 1956, so basin-level cooperative management never developed.
- Court bar diluted: Although Article 262(2) bars courts, States approach the Supreme Court under Article 136 and Article 32, adding another layer of litigation.
Process inadequacies
- Delay: The Cauvery tribunal was set up only in 1990 after a Supreme Court order; its final award came in 2007 and was notified only in February 2013.
- Unfinished awards: The Ravi-Beas tribunal (1986) has yet to see its report implemented, and Punjab passed the Termination of Agreements Act 2004 to undo the water-sharing pact.
- Politicisation: Water becomes an emotive electoral issue, so governments avoid compromise and the Centre hesitates to act.
- Data gaps: Flow and usage data are held and disputed by States; there is no trusted, neutral database.
Reforms
- Institutional fixes: A permanent tribunal, basin organisations, a neutral data agency and time-bound implementation, as the Sarkaria Commission and the draft National Water Policy 2012 suggest.
The failure is due to both structure and process: the design lacks permanence and enforcement, and the process is slowed by delay and political defiance. Basin-wide cooperative management with binding, time-bound adjudication is the way to turn rivers from sources of conflict into shared assets. (Later: the Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2019 proposed a single permanent tribunal.)
Read more — sources
- OfficialConstitution of India, Article 262; Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 (amended 2002)
- ReportSarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations, Report 1988 — Ch. Inter-State River Water Disputes
- BookRamaswamy R. Iyer, Water: Perspectives, Issues, Concerns
- BookM. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity — Ch. Inter-State Relations
More from GS Paper 2 2013
Model answer by the EdiShorts editorial team. It is one well-argued treatment of the question, written to the official word limit — not an official UPSC answer key.