The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is viewed as a cardinal subset of China's larger 'One Belt One Road' initiative. Give a brief description of CPEC and enumerate the reasons why India has distanced itself from the same.
Give a brief factual sketch of CPEC (route, scale, components), then list India's reasons for staying out, each with a concrete basis.
Common trap: The sovereignty objection over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is the core reason and must come first, citing India's stated position before the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum. Add the strategic, debt and transparency concerns, and show India's alternatives rather than mere opposition.
SyllabusRole of external state and non-state actors in creating challenges to internal security.
Model answer
10 marks · 150-word limitThe China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, agreed during President Xi Jinping's visit to Islamabad in April 2015 with about 46 billion dollars of projects, is the Belt and Road Initiative's flagship, linking Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar.
- Kashgar, Xinjiang
- Khunjerab Pass and Karakoram Highway
- Gilgit-Baltistan (Indian territory under Pakistan)
- Punjab and Sindh energy and road projects
- Gwadar port near the Strait of Hormuz
CPEC in brief
- Route: A roughly 3,000 km network of roads, rail and pipelines down the Karakoram Highway to Gwadar, giving China an Arabian Sea outlet that bypasses Malacca.
- Components: Coal power plants such as Sahiwal and Port Qasim, Gwadar port, motorways, the ML-1 railway upgrade and special economic zones.
Why India has distanced itself
- Sovereignty: CPEC runs through Gilgit-Baltistan, part of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistan's occupation. On 13 May 2017 the MEA said no country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity, and India skipped the Belt and Road Forum.
- Strategic encirclement: Gwadar, with Chinese projects in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, could give dual-use naval access near India.
- Debt and transparency: Opaque terms raise debt-trap concerns; Sri Lanka leased Hambantota port to a Chinese firm for 99 years in 2017.
- China-Pakistan nexus: Deeper stakes in Pakistan harden Beijing's stand, as in its UN holds on listing Masood Azhar.
India's response
- Alternatives: Chabahar port (first phase opened December 2017), the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.
- Consistency: At the SCO Qingdao summit in June 2018 India alone did not endorse the BRI. Since then, it has stayed away from later Belt and Road Forums.
India's stand is principled, not obstructionist: it backs connectivity built on openness and rule of law, but not at the cost of its territorial integrity. Its credibility rests on delivering alternatives on time.
Read more — sources
- OfficialMinistry of External Affairs — Official Spokesperson's response to a query on participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum (13 May 2017)
- OfficialMinistry of External Affairs — Annual Report 2017-18
- OfficialGovernment of Pakistan, Ministry of Planning — CPEC Long Term Plan (2017-2030)
- BookShivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy
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Model answer by the EdiShorts editorial team. It is one well-argued treatment of the question, written to the official word limit — not an official UPSC answer key.