Examine whether the constitutional office of the Lok Sabha Speaker has become vulnerable to partisan politics under the current anti-defection regime. What institutional changes are required to ensure the neutrality of the Lok Sabha Speaker in managing a polarised House?
Inspect the claim closely, testing it against evidence on both sides.
Common trap: Two directives: examine, then prescribe. Reserve roughly a third of the answer for the institutional changes — scripts that diagnose well and then offer one vague line on reform lose the second half of the marks.
SyllabusParliament and State legislatures — structure, functioning, conduct of business, powers and privileges and issues arising out of these.
Model answer
157 words · 150-word limitThe Tenth Schedule made the Speaker sole adjudicator of defection while leaving him a party member dependent on that party for re-election. The vulnerability is structural, not personal.
Paragraph 6 vests disqualification solely in the Speaker. Kihoto Hollohan (1992) held he acts as a tribunal and subjected the decision to judicial review, but only once made. With no time limit prescribed, indefinite delay can itself settle the political outcome — which is why Keisham Meghachandra (2020) urged decisions within three months and an independent tribunal instead. Discretion over Money Bill certification under Article 110 compounds the exposure.
Counterweights exist: Article 100 gives only a casting vote, and judicial review now operates.
The changes follow from the diagnosis — move Tenth Schedule adjudication to an independent tribunal, impose a statutory time limit, adopt the Westminster convention of resigning party membership, and fill the Deputy Speaker's post as Article 93 requires. Neutrality needs the function removed, not better temperament.
Answer plan — how to structure itShowHide
Open with: The Tenth Schedule made the Speaker the sole adjudicator of disqualification while leaving him a member of the ruling party dependent on it for re-election — a structural conflict of interest rather than a failure of individuals.
Where the vulnerability comes from
- Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule vests disqualification decisions solely in the Speaker, whose decision was originally made final
- Kihoto Hollohan (1992) held the Speaker acts as a tribunal here and subjected the decision to judicial review, but only after it is made
- No time limit was prescribed, so indefinite delay can itself decide the political outcome — the Court in Keisham Meghachandra (2020) urged decisions within roughly three months and suggested an independent tribunal
- The Speaker does not resign party membership on election, unlike the British convention
- Additional discretion — certifying a Bill as a Money Bill under Article 110, allocation of time, admitting motions — deepens the exposure
The counter-view
- Article 100 gives the Speaker a casting vote only, signalling neutrality by design
- Rules of Procedure and long convention constrain arbitrary conduct
- Judicial review after Kihoto Hollohan is a genuine check
Institutional changes worth arguing for
- Shift Tenth Schedule adjudication to an independent authority — the President acting on Election Commission advice, or a permanent tribunal headed by a retired judge
- Statutory time limit for deciding disqualification petitions
- Convention that the Speaker resigns party membership, on the Westminster model; the 'once a Speaker, always a Speaker' proposal
- Codify the Money Bill certification test to reduce discretion
- Strengthen the Deputy Speaker convention of appointment from the Opposition, and fill the post promptly as Article 93 requires
Draw: A flow diagram of a defection petition — filing, Speaker's discretion, delay, judicial review — with the point of political capture marked at the delay stage.
Close with: The office is vulnerable by design, not by character; the remedy is to remove the adjudicatory function from it rather than to demand better temperament from its holders.
Read more — sources
- NCERTIndian Constitution at Work (Class XI) — Ch. 5, Legislature
- BookM. Laxmikanth, Indian Polity — Anti-Defection Law; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)
- EdiShorts appMains GS-2 — Polity: Parliament
Related questions from earlier years
More from GS Paper 2 2026
Model answer by the EdiShorts editorial team. It is one well-argued treatment of the question, written to the official word limit — not an official UPSC answer key.