What is meant by judicial legislation? In this context, discuss the verdicts of the apex court allowing “passive euthanasia” and a “living will”.
Present the issue from more than one side with reasoning, then arrive at a considered position.
Common trap: Define first, then apply — in that order. Case names with years are the currency here: Vishaka, Aruna Shanbaug, Common Cause. An answer arguing the separation-of-powers theory without them reads as undergraduate.
SyllabusStructure, organization and functioning of the Judiciary; separation of powers between various organs.
Model answer
268 words · 250-word limitJudicial legislation is the making of binding general norms by a court where no statute exists — distinct from interpretation, and sitting at the edge of the separation of powers the Constitution assumes. Its instruments are Article 141, which makes Supreme Court law binding, and Article 142, which permits orders for complete justice.
The classic instances are the Vishaka guidelines (1997) on workplace sexual harassment, displaced only in 2013 by statute, and the D.K. Basu arrest directions. Reading Article 21 expansively remains interpretation; issuing an enforceable code of conduct is legislation.
Aruna Shanbaug (2011) illustrates the practice. The Court rejected active euthanasia but permitted passive euthanasia in narrowly defined circumstances, prescribing a High Court-supervised procedure through a medical board expressly to operate until Parliament legislated.
Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) went further. Following Puttaswamy on autonomy, it held that the right to die with dignity is intrinsic to Article 21, recognised the Advance Medical Directive or living will, and laid down a detailed procedure — execution before witnesses, countersignature by a judicial magistrate, and primary and review medical boards.
The assessment cuts both ways. The Court filled a genuine vacuum where legislative inaction was producing continuing rights violations, and framed its directions as provisional. Yet courts lack the consultation and impact-assessment machinery legislatures possess, and the 2018 procedure proved unworkable enough that the Court itself simplified it in 2023.
These verdicts are defensible judicial legislation — vacuum-prompted, rights-grounded and expressly interim. Their later revision is precisely the evidence that the interim character must be taken seriously, and that the Law Commission's call for legislation remains unanswered.
Answer plan — how to structure itShowHide
Open with: Judicial legislation is the making of binding general norms by a court in the absence of statute — distinct from interpretation, and sitting at the edge of the separation of powers the Constitution assumes.
The concept
- Courts filling a legislative vacuum by laying down enforceable guidelines that operate until Parliament legislates
- Sources: Article 141 making Supreme Court law binding on all courts; Article 142 permitting orders for complete justice; Article 32's remedial breadth
- Classic instances: Vishaka (1997) guidelines on workplace sexual harassment, later replaced by the 2013 Act; D.K. Basu (1997) arrest guidelines; Vineet Narain (1998) on CVC
- Distinguished from creative interpretation — reading Article 21 expansively is interpretation; issuing a code of conduct is legislation
Aruna Shanbaug (2011)
- Rejected active euthanasia but permitted passive euthanasia — withdrawal of life support — in narrowly defined circumstances
- Laid down a High Court-supervised procedure through a medical board, expressly to operate until Parliament legislated
- A textbook instance of interim judicial law-making
Common Cause v. Union of India (2018)
- Held the right to die with dignity is intrinsic to the right to life under Article 21, following Puttaswamy on autonomy
- recognised the Advance Medical Directive or 'living will'
- laid down a detailed procedure — execution before witnesses, countersignature by a judicial magistrate, primary and review medical boards
- overruled the position that consent could not be given in advance
Assessment
- In favour: fills a genuine vacuum where legislative inaction causes ongoing rights violations; gives effect to Article 21; guidelines are expressly provisional
- Against: courts lack the machinery for consultation, impact assessment and revision that legislatures possess; guidelines bind without democratic authorship
- The 2018 procedure proved unworkable in practice, and the Court itself simplified it in 2023 — evidence of the institutional limitation
- The Law Commission's 241st Report had recommended legislation; Parliament has not enacted it
Draw: A spectrum diagram — interpretation, creative interpretation, judicial legislation, usurpation — with each cited case placed on it.
Close with: These verdicts are defensible judicial legislation: prompted by a vacuum, expressly provisional and rights-grounded — but their subsequent revision shows why the provisional character must be taken seriously.
Read more — sources
- NCERTIndian Constitution at Work (Class XI) — Ch. 6, Judiciary
- BookCommon Cause v. Union of India (2018); Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011); Law Commission 241st Report
- EdiShorts appMains GS-2 — Polity: Judiciary
Related questions from earlier years
More from GS Paper 2 2026
Model answer by the EdiShorts editorial team. It is one well-argued treatment of the question, written to the official word limit — not an official UPSC answer key.