Case study: Raman is a senior IPS officer and has recently been posted as D.G.
Lay out Raman's realistic options and choose among them, then propose institutional measures and a concrete intelligence action plan; each of the three sub-parts must be answered separately.
Common trap: Weak answers treat this as pure internal security and propose blanket surveillance of the targeted community. A top answer pairs firm, lawful action against recruiters with outreach to vulnerable youth, separates criticism of government from incitement, and builds safeguards against profiling into the intelligence plan.
SyllabusCase Studies on above issues. (Public/Civil service values and Ethics in Public administration: ethical concerns and dilemmas in government and private institutions; laws, rules, regulations and conscience as sources of ethical guidance; accountability and ethical governance.)
The case
Raman is a senior IPS officer and has recently been posted as D.G. of a state. Among the various issues and problems/challenges which needed his immediate attention, the issue relating to recruitment of unemployed youth by an unknown terrorist group, was a matter of grave concern. It was noted that unemployment was relatively high in the state. The problem of unemployment amongst graduates and those with higher education was much more grave. Thus they were vulnerable and soft targets. In the review meeting taken by him with senior officers of DIG Range and above, it came to light that a new terrorist group has emerged at the global level. It has launched a massive drive to recruit young unemployed people. Special focus was to pick young people from a particular community. The said organisation seemed to have the clear objective of utilising/using them for carrying out militant activities. It was also gathered that the said (new) group is desperately trying to spread its tentacles in his state. A definite/reliable intelligence tip was received by the State CID and Cyber Cell that a large number of such unemployed youth have already been contacted by the terrorist outfit/group through social media and local communal organisations and other contacts. The need of the hour was to act swiftly and to check these elements/designs before they assume serious proportions. Discrete inquiries made by the police, through the Cyber Cell, revealed that good numbers of unemployed youth are very active on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. On an average, many of them were spending 6–8 hours each day, using electronic devices/internet, etc. It also came to light that such unemployed youth were showing sympathy and endorsing the messages received from certain persons, allegedly the contact persons of that global terrorist group. Their social media accounts revealed their strong affinity to such groups inasmuch as many of them started forwarding anti-national tweets on their WhatsApp and Facebook, etc. It seemed that they succumbed to their ploy and started propagating secessionist ideology. Their posts were hyper-critical of the government’s initiatives, policies and subscribing to extreme beliefs and promoting extremism. (a) What are the options available to Raman to tackle the above situation? (b) What measures would you suggest for strengthening the existing set-up to ensure that such groups do not succeed in penetrating and vitiating the atmosphere in the state? (c) In the above scenario, what action plan would you advise for enhancing the intelligence gathering mechanism of the police force?
Model answer
20 marks · 250-word limitRadicalisation feeds on grievance and isolation; graduate unemployment, hours online and local communal networks give a global outfit its opening. Raman must break the recruitment drive under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 without stigmatising a whole community.
- Educated but unemployed youth
- 6–8 hours a day on social media
- Contact via social media and local communal organisations
- Endorsing and forwarding anti-national, secessionist posts
- Recruitment for militant activities
(a) Options available to Raman
| Option | Merits | Demerits |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Blanket crackdown on the targeted community | Quick show of deterrence | Violates Articles 14, 19 and 21; feeds the outfit's narrative |
| 2. Keep watching and wait for an overt act | Avoids backlash | Neglect of duty despite a reliable tip; risk of an attack |
| 3. Targeted action against handlers and fronts under UAPA, with blocking of content through the Centre under Section 69A of the IT Act | Hits the network, not the vulnerable; lawful | Needs evidence and central coordination; treats symptoms only |
| 4. Option 3 plus counselling, community outreach and livelihood links | Tackles both threat and cause; durable | Needs several departments and sustained effort |
- Preferred course: Option 4, because it is proportionate, the test the Supreme Court applied to privacy in Puttaswamy (2017) and to internet curbs in Anuradha Bhasin (2020).
- Dissent is not a crime: Posts hyper-critical of government policy are protected speech; Shreya Singhal (2015) allows curbs only on incitement, so action must target recruitment and secessionist calls.
(b) Strengthening the existing set-up
- Specialised capacity: Create a counter-radicalisation and cyber-forensics wing in the State's anti-terror unit, coordinating with the NIA and the Multi-Agency Centre.
- Digital front: Run a 24x7 social-media monitoring cell, seek swift takedowns from intermediaries under the IT Rules, 2021, and work with the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre.
- Community policing: Adapt Kerala's Janamaithri Suraksha model: beat officers, parents, teachers and respected religious leaders as partners, not suspects.
- Hope over hate: With the district administration, link at-risk graduates to skilling and placement, and run counter-narratives in colleges.
- Follow the money: Audit the funding of the suspect communal organisations, including any foreign contributions under the FCRA, 2010.
(c) Action plan for better intelligence gathering
- Revive human intelligence: Retrain beat constables and Special Branch staff to build trusted community contacts who flag early signs such as sudden isolation or new handlers.
- Lawful open-source intelligence: Extend the Cyber Cell's discreet inquiries with analytics on public posts to map recruiters and groups; intercept only with legal authorisation.
- Fusion and sharing: Set up a state fusion centre joining CID, Cyber Cell and district units, sharing real-time inputs with neighbouring states and the Multi-Agency Centre, and drawing on NATGRID.
- Skills and oversight: Recruit cyber specialists and linguists, reward quality inputs, and have a senior committee review surveillance to prevent communal profiling.
Terror recruiters win when the state either ignores alienated youth or treats a whole community as suspect. Precise policing, sharper intelligence and real opportunity for the young together deny the outfit both recruits and narrative, upholding national security and constitutional morality alike.
Read more — sources
- OfficialUnlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
- OfficialInformation Technology Act, 2000 (Section 69A) and IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
- ReportSecond Administrative Reforms Commission, 8th Report — Combating Terrorism (2008)
- OfficialShreya Singhal v. Union of India, Supreme Court of India (2015)
Related questions from earlier years
More from GS Paper 4 (Ethics) 2024
Model answer by the EdiShorts editorial team. It is one well-argued treatment of the question, written to the official word limit — not an official UPSC answer key.