Vikas, DC Nainipura — biometric authentication in PDS failing children, labourers and the elderly.
250 words across both parts, 20 marks. Identify stakeholders and the conflicting values, weigh the options, then commit to one course with safeguards. There is no single correct answer — there is a defensible one.
Common trap: Part (b) is a distinct conceptual question worth real marks — do not let it collapse into part (a). The asymmetry between exclusion and inclusion errors is the argument that carries both halves.
The case
Vikas is a government officer with over a decade of service in public administration. He has recently moved as the District Collector (DC) of Nainipura, a remote hilly district bordering a forest. Due to Nainipura's low levels of economic development, one of his major duties is to ensure proper functioning of the public distribution system (PDS) amongst the economically weaker sections (EWS).
During his on-site visits, Vikas was apprised of a typical administrative challenge in operating its PDS. To prevent leakages, all distributors were required to carry out real-time biometric identification of the beneficiaries, whose fingerprints were tallied with identity card records. This was creating problems as the operating system sometimes rejected fingerprint matching in the cases of growing children, manual labourers and senior citizens. The problem was further compounded in periods of low WiFi connectivity. The distributors, in such cases, resorted to personal discretion when they could identify the recipient.
Vikas had to address this problem on priority. Strictly adhering to government regulations would ensure fiscal probity but would greatly trouble the proposed beneficiary, i.e., EWS. It may even impinge on their fundamental right to life as per Article 21 of the Constitution. Conversely, leaving the resolution solely to the discretion of the distributors could lead to misuse and leakages.
Model answer
20 marks · 250 wordsAn anti-leakage control that excludes precisely the people it was built to serve — where relaxing it invites diversion and enforcing it denies food to those entitled to it.
| EWS beneficiaries | Food security and the right to life under Article 21; excluded by a technical failure not of their making |
| Manual labourers, children, the elderly | Worn or changing fingerprints make them structurally more likely to be denied |
| Fair price shop distributors | Carrying unauthorised discretion and personal risk either way |
| Vikas and the State | Fiscal probity, leakage control, and accountability for exclusion errors |
| Taxpayers | Legitimate interest in preventing diversion of subsidised grain |
- Exclusion error versus inclusion error — the two are not morally equivalent: wrongly denying food to the entitled is graver than wrongly including some ineligible
- Article 21 and the NFSA, 2013 create an entitlement; a verification method cannot lawfully extinguish it
- Technology as gatekeeper — authentication designed for the median user systematically fails outliers, and the outliers here are the poorest
- Displacement of accountability onto distributors, who exercise unauthorised discretion without protection or record
- Dignity — repeated public failure at the ration shop is humiliating, not merely inconvenient
- Means-ends inversion — leakage control was the means and food security the end; strict enforcement reverses them
- Distributive justice — the burden of an infrastructure failure falls on those least able to bear it
Course of action. Institute a layered authentication protocol — biometric first, then documented alternatives — with offline transaction capability, so no entitled beneficiary is turned away and every exception is recorded.
Why. The choice is not between probity and empathy but between unrecorded discretion and recorded procedure. The present arrangement already grants exceptions; it simply grants them invisibly, which is the worst of both worlds — the leakage risk remains and the beneficiary has no protection. Formalising the exception converts an unaccountable favour into an auditable entitlement. On the underlying moral question, exclusion and inclusion errors are not symmetric: wrongly denying grain to a hungry family is a graver wrong than wrongly including someone ineligible, because the first is irreversible harm to a right-holder and the second is a recoverable fiscal loss.
Safeguards. Enable offline authentication with later synchronisation so connectivity failure never denies grain. Permit documented alternatives — OTP to a registered mobile, iris scan, nominee authentication, or attestation by a designated local authority — each recorded with reason. Cap and monitor the exception rate per shop, investigating outliers rather than blocking transactions. Publish beneficiary lists locally for social audit. Provide a grievance number displayed at every shop and a same-day escalation route. Report the systemic device and connectivity failure upward with data, since the fix ultimately lies above the district.
Verdict. On part (b): technology used as a gatekeeper transfers the burden of state failure onto the citizen, and does so most heavily on those with the least capacity to contest it. It is ethically defensible only when it is one route among several, never the sole gate — an entitlement conferred by statute cannot be conditioned on a fingerprint reader working.
More from GS Paper 4 (Ethics) 2026
Model answer by the EdiShorts editorial team. It is one well-argued treatment of the question, written to the official word limit — not an official UPSC answer key.